

# Classifications of Symmetric Normal Form Games

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# Normal Form Games

## Example (Two-Player Game)

	<i>c</i>	<i>d</i>
<i>a</i>	3, 3	1, 4
<i>b</i>	4, 1	2, 2

How is such a game played?

What does a normal form game consist of?

## Notation

- $N = \{1, 2\}$ ; (set of players)
- $A_1 = \{a, b\}$ ,  $A_2 = \{c, d\}$ ; (strategy sets)
- $A = A_1 \times A_2 = \{(a, c), (a, d), (b, c), (b, d)\}$ ; (strategy profiles)
- $u_1, u_2 : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ ; (payoff/utility functions)
- $u_2(b, c) = 1$ .

## Definition

A **normal form game**  $\Gamma$  consists of a (finite) set  $N$  of at least two players, and for each player  $i \in N$ :

- A non-empty (finite) set of **strategies**  $A_i$ ; and
- A **payoff/utility** function  $u_i : A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  where  $A = \times_{i \in N} A_i$  is the set of **strategy profiles**.

# Normal Form Games

## Example (Three-Player Game)

	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>
<i>c</i>	1, 1, 1	2, 2, 3
<i>d</i>	2, 3, 2	5, 4, 4

(*a*, , )

	<i>e</i>	<i>f</i>
<i>c</i>	3, 2, 2	4, 5, 4
<i>d</i>	4, 4, 5	6, 6, 6

(*b*, , )

- $N = \{1, 2, 3\}$ ;
- $A_1 = \{a, b\}$ ,  $A_2 = \{c, d\}$ ,  $A_3 = \{e, f\}$ ;
- $A = \{(a, c, e), (a, c, f), (a, d, e), (a, d, f), (b, c, e), (b, c, f), (b, d, e), (b, d, f)\}$ ;
- $u_3(b, d, e) = 5$ .

# Player Permutations $S_N$ Acting on Strategy Profiles $A$

Suppose each player has the same strategy set.

$$\text{Eg. } A_1 = A_2 = A_3 = \{a, b\}.$$

Let  $\pi \in S_N$  be a permutation of the players.

## Proposition

The player permutations act on the left of strategy profiles via

$$\pi(s_1, \dots, s_n) = (s_{\pi^{-1}(1)}, \dots, s_{\pi^{-1}(n)}).$$

## Example

Take  $\pi = (123) \in S_3$  and  $(s_1, s_2, s_3) \in A$ .

$$\pi(s_1, s_2, s_3) = (s_{\pi^{-1}(1)}, s_{\pi^{-1}(2)}, s_{\pi^{-1}(3)}) = (s_3, s_1, s_2)$$

Eg.  $\pi(a, b, a) = (a, a, b)$

# Game Invariants

## Definition (von Neumann)

$\pi \in S_N$  is an **invariant** of a game  $\Gamma$  if for each player  $i \in N$  and strategy profile  $s \in A$ ,  $u_i(s) = u_{\pi(i)}(\pi(s))$ .

Invariants give us a notion of players being indifferent between current positions and an alternative arrangement of positions.

## Example

	$a$	$b$
$a$	1, 1, 1	2, 2, 3
$b$	2, 3, 2	5, 4, 4

$(a, , )$

	$a$	$b$
$a$	3, 2, 2	4, 5, 4
$b$	4, 4, 5	6, 6, 6

$(b, , )$

- $(123)$  and  $(23)$  are invariants of  $\Gamma$ ;

Eg. Let  $\pi = (123)$ , then  $u_2(a, b, a) = u_{\pi(2)}(\pi(a, b, a)) = u_3(a, a, b) = 3$ .

- $\langle (123), (23) \rangle = S_3$  (invariants of  $\Gamma$ ).

# Label-Dependent Notions of Symmetry

## Definition

$\Gamma$  is:

- **fully symmetric** (vNM) if it is invariant under  $S_N$ ; and
- **standard symmetric** (Stein?) if it is invariant under a transitive subgroup of  $S_N$ .

## Example (Standard Symmetric Three-Player Game)

	$a$	$b$
$a$	1, 1, 1	2, 3, 4
$b$	3, 4, 2	5, 6, 7

$(a, ,)$

	$a$	$b$
$a$	4, 2, 3	7, 5, 6
$b$	6, 7, 5	8, 8, 8

$(b, ,)$

- $\Gamma$  is invariant under  $(123)$  and not invariant under  $(23)$ ;
- $\langle (123) \rangle = \{e, (123), (132)\}$  is a transitive subgroup of  $S_3$ ;

**Note:** Must have  $u_i(a, a, a) = u_j(a, a, a)$  for all  $i, j \in N$  etc.

# Are We There Yet?

## Questions

- What if players have different strategy sets?
- Have we fully captured fairness? No

## Example (Matching Pennies)

	<i>H</i>	<i>T</i>
<i>H</i>	1, -1	-1, 1
<i>T</i>	-1, 1	1, -1



# Game Bijections

## Definition (Nash)

A **bijection** from  $\Gamma$  to itself consists of a player permutation  $\pi \in S_N$  and for each player  $i \in N$ , a strategy set bijection  $\tau_i : A_i \rightarrow A_{\pi(i)}$ .

**Notation:**  $\text{Bij}(\Gamma)$  denotes the game bijections from  $\Gamma$  to itself.

## Example

$$g = ((123); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ d & c \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ e & f \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ a & b \end{pmatrix})$$

**Note:**  $\text{Bij}(\Gamma) \cong (S_m \text{ Wr } S_n)$ .

## Proposition

Game bijections act on the left of players and strategy profiles.

## Example

$$g(2) = 3 \text{ and } g(b, d, e) = (a, c, f)$$

# Game Bijections

## Definition

Let  $G \leq \text{Bij}(\Gamma)$ . The **stabiliser of player**  $i \in N$  is the subgroup  $G_i = \{g \in G : g(i) = i\} \leq G$ .

## Properties (Stein)

We say that  $G$  is:

- **player transitive** if for each  $i, j \in N$  there exists  $g \in G$  such that  $g(i) = j$ ;
- **player  $n$ -transitive** if for each  $\pi \in S_N$  there exists  $g \in G$  such that  $g(i) = \pi(i)$  for all  $i \in N$ ; and
- **strategy trivial** if for each  $g \in G_i$ ,  $g(s_i) = s_i$  for all  $s_i \in A_i$ .

## Theorem (Stein)

Strategy trivial subgroups act on strategy profiles equivalently to permutations for some relabelling of the strategies.

# Automorphism Group

## Definition (Nash)

An **automorphism** of  $\Gamma$  is an invariant bijection  $g \in \text{Bij}(\Gamma)$ .

$$\text{i.e. } u_i(s) = u_{g(i)}(g(s)) \text{ for all } i \in N, s \in A.$$

The automorphisms of  $\Gamma$  form a group which we denote as  $\text{Aut}(\Gamma)$ .

## Example (Matching Pennies)

	$H$	$T$
$H$	1, -1	-1, 1
$T$	-1, 1	1, -1

$$\text{Aut}(\Gamma) = \left\{ \left( e; \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ H & T \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ H & T \end{pmatrix} \right), \left( e; \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ T & H \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ T & H \end{pmatrix} \right), \right. \\ \left. \left( (12); \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ H & T \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ T & H \end{pmatrix} \right), \left( (12); \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ T & H \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} H & T \\ H & T \end{pmatrix} \right) \right\}$$

$\text{Aut}(\Gamma)$  is player  $n$ -transitive, is not strategy trivial and contains no proper transitive subgroups.

# Label-Independent Notions of Symmetry

## Corollary (Stein)


The following conditions are equivalent:

- there exists standard symmetric  $\Gamma'$  such that  $\Gamma' \cong \Gamma$ ;
- $\text{Aut}(\Gamma)$  has a player transitive and strategy trivial subgroup.

## Definition

$\Gamma$  is:

- **symmetric** if  $\text{Aut}(\Gamma)$  is player transitive; and
- **$n$ -transitive** if  $\text{Aut}(\Gamma)$  is player  $n$ -transitive.



# Parameterised Games

## Definition

Let  $G \subseteq \text{Bij}(\Gamma)$ . We construct the **parameterised game**  $\Gamma(G)$  of  $G$  by assigning a parameter to each orbit in  $(N \times A)/\langle G \rangle$ .

## Example

$g = ((12); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ a & b \end{pmatrix})$  requires that we have,

$$\begin{array}{ll} u_1(a, c) = u_2(a, c) = \alpha & u_1(a, d) = u_2(b, c) = \gamma \\ u_1(b, c) = u_2(a, d) = \beta & u_1(b, d) = u_2(b, d) = \delta \end{array}$$

	$c$	$d$
$a$	$\alpha, \alpha$	$\gamma, \beta$
$b$	$\beta, \gamma$	$\delta, \delta$

**Note:**  $\langle G \rangle$  can be a proper subgroup of  $\text{Aut}(\Gamma(G))$ .

# Parameterised Games

## Example ( $n$ -Transitive Standard Non-Fully Symmetric Game)

	$e$	$f$
$c$	$\alpha, \alpha, \alpha$	$\beta, \gamma, \delta$
$d$	$\gamma, \delta, \beta$	$\delta, \gamma, \beta$

$(a, ,)$

	$e$	$f$
$c$	$\delta, \beta, \gamma$	$\beta, \delta, \gamma$
$d$	$\gamma, \beta, \delta$	$\alpha, \alpha, \alpha$

$(b, ,)$

$$G = \{((123); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ e & f \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}), ((12); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ d & c \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ b & a \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ f & e \end{pmatrix})\}$$

- $\langle G \rangle$  is player  $n$ -transitive;
- $\langle ((123); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ e & f \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}) \rangle$  is transitive and strategy trivial;
- $((12); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ e & f \end{pmatrix}) \notin \text{Aut}(\Gamma(G))$ .

# Parameterised Games

## Example (Only-Transitive Non-Standard Symmetric Game)

	$g$	$h$
$e$	$\alpha, \alpha, \beta, \beta$	$\gamma, \delta, \delta, \gamma$
$f$	$\delta, \gamma, \gamma, \delta$	$\beta, \beta, \alpha, \alpha$

$(a, c, ,)$

	$g$	$h$
$e$	$\delta, \gamma, \gamma, \delta$	$\beta, \beta, \alpha, \alpha$
$f$	$\alpha, \alpha, \beta, \beta$	$\gamma, \delta, \delta, \gamma$

$(b, c, ,)$

	$g$	$h$
$e$	$\gamma, \delta, \delta, \gamma$	$\alpha, \alpha, \beta, \beta$
$f$	$\beta, \beta, \alpha, \alpha$	$\delta, \gamma, \gamma, \delta$

$(a, d, ,)$

	$g$	$h$
$e$	$\beta, \beta, \alpha, \alpha$	$\delta, \gamma, \gamma, \delta$
$f$	$\gamma, \delta, \delta, \gamma$	$\alpha, \alpha, \beta, \beta$

$(b, d, ,)$


$$G = \left\{ \left( (12) \circ (34); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ d & c \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ h & g \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} g & h \\ e & f \end{pmatrix} \right), \right. \\
\left. \left( (13) \circ (24); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ f & e \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ h & g \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ a & b \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} g & h \\ c & d \end{pmatrix} \right), \right. \\
\left. \left( (14) \circ (23); \begin{pmatrix} a & b \\ h & g \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} c & d \\ f & e \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} e & f \\ c & d \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} g & h \\ a & b \end{pmatrix} \right) \right\}$$

# Partially Ordering Parameterised Games

## Definition

Define  $\leq$  on parameterised games as follows:  $\Gamma(G) \leq \Gamma(G')$  when given a set of parameters for  $\Gamma(G')$  there exists a set of parameters for  $\Gamma(G)$  such that  $\Gamma(G) \cong \Gamma(G')$ .


## Example (Symmetric 2-Player 2-Strategy Games up to Isomorphism)





# Partially Ordering Parameterised Games

## Example (Symmetric 3-Player 2-Strategy Games up to Isomorphism)



Questions?